CyberScrip

A fungible ERC-20 token that tracks the units of one LET contract's Ledger Entry Tokens (LETs) in a fixed ratio (setScripRatio on the IssuanceManager). Holders convert LET units into scrip and back through the IssuanceManager. The IssuanceManager deploys the scrip with deployCyberScrip, at most one per LedgerEntryToken contract. Scrip's rights come from the company's governing documents and the scrip's terms; under MetaLeX-form bylaws scrip is not stock and confers no stockholder rights on its own.

• Source: src/CyberScrip.sol / interface ICyberScrip.sol
• Inherits: ERC20Upgradeable, BorgAuthACL, ICyberScrip
• Pattern: beacon proxy; the IssuanceManager owns the beacon
• DEPLOY_VERSION: "5"; the scrip of a company that has not upgraded reports "4" or lower

The IssuanceManager drives scripification and de-scripification, so mint and burnFrom are onlyIssuanceManager. The compliance controls other than force burn are onlyIssuanceManagerOrAdmin, so a cyberCORP admin (BorgAuth level 98 or above) calls them on the scrip directly.

Mint and burn

function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyIssuanceManager;
function burnFrom(address account, uint256 amount) external onlyIssuanceManager;

Compliance powers

CyberScrip has three compliance powers and no blocklist.

Power	Function	Gate	Enabled at deploy by	Disable (one-way)
Force transfer	forceTransfer(from, to, amount)	manager or admin	enableForceTransfer	disableForceTransfer()
Force burn	forceBurn(account, amount)	manager only	enableForceBurn	disableForceBurn()
Freeze	setFrozen(account, isFrozen)	manager or admin	enableFreeze	disableFreeze()

Each disable* function is onlyIssuanceManagerOrAdmin and irreversible: a disabled power cannot be re-enabled. A power works only while its can* flag is true; otherwise the call reverts ComplianceFeatureDisabled.

Force burn is manager-only because it must also withdraw the matching backing units from the LET contract's scrip vault. An admin exercises it through IssuanceManager.forceScripBurn (see IssuanceManager). Force transfer and force burn bypass the transfer hooks and the freeze.

A frozen account cannot send or receive scrip. While freezing is enabled, the IssuanceManager also refuses to let a frozen account scripify a LET or convert scrip back into a LET (AccountFrozen).

Transfer restrictions

setRestrictionHook(ITransferRestrictionHook[]) (onlyIssuanceManagerOrAdmin) replaces the whole array of transfer hooks. Every transfer and mint (any move to a nonzero address) runs each hook's checkTransferRestriction, and a false result reverts RestrictedTransfer(reason). Burns skip the hooks. Frozen accounts (when canFreeze) revert AccountFrozen.

Holder cap

setMaxHolderCount(uint256) (onlyIssuanceManagerOrAdmin) sets a maximum holder count (0 = unlimited, the default) and emits MaxHolderCountUpdated. A transfer that would exceed it reverts HolderLimitExceeded.

On a v4 company the holder cap cannot be set: the v4 scrip's setter is onlyIssuanceManager, and the v4 IssuanceManager has no function that calls it.

Views

certPrinter, issuanceManager, transferRestrictionHooks(i), transferRestrictionHooksLength, canForceTransfer, canForceBurn, canFreeze, frozen(account), holderCount / currentHolderCount, maxHolderCount, remainingSlots, canTransfer(from, to, amount), willCreateNewHolder(to, amount).

Events

ForceTransfer, ForceBurn, FreezeStatusUpdated, ComplianceFeatureDisabledEvent, MaxHolderCountUpdated.

Errors

RestrictedTransfer, NotIssuanceManager, ComplianceFeatureDisabled, AccountFrozen, HolderLimitExceeded.